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HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS. (Two volumes). Edited by Mark DeWolfe
Howe. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1941. Pp. xxii, 275;
359. Price: $7.50.
Few Americans, if any, other than Washington and Lincoln, have
achieved immortality during their lifetimes, when judged by their contemporaries. Mr. Justice Holmes did. His long and distinguished career
finds no parallel in the annals of our history. As a judge he stands alone.
Known as the "Great Dissenter", he was respected even by those who
differed with him, and there were many who did. His appercu (a favorite
word of Holmes) is attested to by the fact that so many of his dissents
have now become the gospel of the Court. Superior to his colleagues in
vision, perspective and judicial temperament, he appears to have been
gazing down upon the world below from some lofty intellectual Olympus.
For all this, he was very human. As a young soldier he was carried, gravely wounded, from the battle field of Antietam. Forever after
he disliked talking or reading of war. Much about the man was gleaned
long since from his judicial opinions. But how fortunate that there are
now brought to light the Holmes-Pollock letters, giving us greater insight
into Holmes the judge, and a hitherto unknown story of Holmes the man.
How unique that two great men should have maintained a steadfast friendship for more than half a century; even more unique that this friendship
existed between men of different nations, separated by three thousand
miles save for occasional meetings. That the two friends should now give
us, in two volumes, the details of their friendship-by-correspondence is
little short of manna from heaven.
Philosophically, Holmes is and probably ever will be an enigma. Various schools of thought have for years claimed him as a disciple. But even
as the lines of demarcation between schools of thought are never sharply
drawn, so is it impossible to place Holmes completely within the confines
of any one. He never confessed to a basic philosophy of his own; he was
content to toy with a belief about man's place in the universe, but this
remained always with him no more than a belief. Perhaps he reveals himself to be at times philosophically inconsistent, but doubtless he would not
have considered absolute consistency a virtue. With Hegel he disagreed
vehemently; with William James he was in no greater accord. John
Dewey came in for less criticism; Holmes was approving of Morris Cohen
and even more so of Santayana. But who can classify Santayana? He
reveals his differences with Brandeis as follows:
"Brandeis the other day drove a harpoon into my midriff with
reference to my summer occupations. He said you talk about improving your mind, you only exercise it on the subjects with which
you are familiar. Why don't you try something new, study some
domain of fact. Take up the textile industries in Massachusetts and
after reading the reports sufficiently you can go to- Lawrence and
get a human notion of how it really is. I hate facts. I always say
the chief end of man is to form general propositions-adding that no
general proposition is worth a damn. Of course a general proposition is simply a string for the facts and I have little doubt that it
would be good for my immortal soul to plunge into them, good also
(x6)
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for the performance of my duties, but I shrink from the bore-or
rather I hate to give up the chance to read this and that, that a gentleman should have read before he dies." I
The same man could write that the "life of the law has not been logic but
experience."
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But if he did not read facts (or newspapers, a neglect which he lived
to regret), Holmes read omnivorously of ancient literature, philosophy,
poetry, drama. He read history somewhat reluctantly, disliked biography,
but found pleasure in Gentlemen Prefer Blondes and even Wodehouse.
Ordinary mortals will delight to know that he shared the popular enjoyment of detective stories,3 which Pollock apparently considered a waste
of time. Respect for Holmes increases when we learn that even after the
age of ninety, he read with a conscious desire for self-improvement, a
practice discontinued by so many after receipt of a college diploma. The
letters are replete with discussions of literature by the two men. Here
Pollock was the constant adviser-he was the more widely read, his mind
was more retentive, even if less profound.
In his vast reading Holmes was quick to perceive ability in others
in the incipient stages of their literary careers. In 1902 he recognized
Wigmore as "a very deserving and superior man"; 4 in 1911 "I rejoiced
that Harvard should have got Pound and wish it had Wigmore as then
I should have thought it better equipped than ever." 5 In 1915 he wrote
of Walter Lippman, "Monstrous clever lad, W. L., and only 26 and he
has done so much." 6 He was fascinated by Harold Laski in 1916; admiration continued thereafter through many years of association during which
Laski exerted a marked influence upon Holmes's extra-curricular reading.
Other writers, less fortunate, were the recipients of stinging criticism
from the pen of Holmes. Among these were Thomas Atkins Street,7 the
student editors of the Harvard Law Review, and even his own brethren
on the Court. Particularly in the earlier days of his judicial career Holmes
i. Ldtter of May 26, 1919, Vol. II, p. 13. On June 27, 1919, he wrote: "I am glad
that you don't treat my proposed excursion into the facts as of the essence of salvation. I have sent for books but ten days have gone by without answer. I think of a
Catholic lady who on a fast day called for bass, then terrapin-not forthcoming-and
then said, 'Bring me a mutton chop. God knows I have tried for fish.' If I am
destined to lapse from facts back into ideas, God knows I have tried for the facts." A
footnote indicates during the summer Holmes did read a report relating to the strike
of textile workers in Lawrence and another concerning the condition of women and
child wage earners.
2. Vol. II, p. 190.
3. Solitaire seemed a regular part of his daily routine.
4. Vol. I, p. io8.
5. Vol. I, p. 187. Less complimentary is the following: "There is a Philadelphian, Bohlen, who is well thought of in Torts. I remember two articles of his-the
fact, but not the content, except that he thought he knew more than I did about taking
the risk, apropos of a case here, and I thought he didn't. But somehow the Philadelphians while not infrequently having the manners of the great world have struck me
as hopelessly injected with the second rate, when I have seen them in their law, on
which they pride themselves-but I would not breathe this aloud." Vol. I, p. I87.
6. Vol. I, p. 229.
7. The reference is to Street's Foundations of Legal Liability. "There is a big
book out on the theory of Legal Liability . . . From a glance it seemed to me on
the one hand a thing that would have been a boon 40 years ago, but under present conditions a rather padded piece of work. I discovered no penetration or personal power
-and without that a writer on such themes rather irritates one and makes one wish
to snub him, as one would snub the young gentlemen of the Harvard Law Rev. for
their cocky notes, if the latter were not a legitimate part of their youth." Vol. I, p.
131.
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was sensitive to criticism s and impatient with mediocrity. There are so
few who are brilliant, so many who write well enough but whose contributions to posterity are limited. In their diffident efforts they should receive encouragement, but the criticism of a Holmes might easily drive
them to cover. It is therefore better that his comments should have been
confined to private correspondence. He was undoubtedly one of that
small group who are competent to criticise; occasionally humble himself,
he was generally confident of the merit in his own efforts. Someone once
said, replying to those who charged Milton with conceit, that the poet
was merely confident of his own ability. So it might have been with
Holmes.
Much more might be included in a resum6 of these letters-of Holmes's
long fight for the protection of civil liberties, of his personal views upon
labor, of his prophetic disagreement with Swift v. Tyson, of his relations
with his colleagues, of his delight over honors rightfully bestowed upon
him. Further amplification is, however, better reserved for those who
read the two volumes. One may be happy to possess them, may feel a
warm glow in merely observing them on his shelves. But greatest satisfaction will come from cutting apart the leaves (pity him who does not)
and finding for one's self the treasure disclosed therein. For it is a treasure-the private thoughts of one of our immortals who was after all a
human being.
John E. Mulder.t

LEGAL TERMINOLOGY. By Erwin Hexner. The University
of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1941. Pp. vi, 15o. Price: $I.5O.
This interesting and stimulating book by Dr. Hexner, formerly of the
University of Bratislava, is a series of essays dealing with some legal concepts, which are again, in these times of world-wide crisis, in the focus both
of political debates and of scientific discussions. As this is so, it may be
questioned whether the title of the book is indicative of its contents: studies
in legal terminology? To a certain extent, yes. But primarily, these are
not studies in legal terminology, but studies in the theory of law. He
who asks what law is, is not occupied with "purely terminological" questions, but with fundamental problems of jurisprudence.
Essentially, Dr. Hexner is a follower of Kelsen's "pure theory of law".
We find, therefore, the strict separation of the spheres of "isness" and of
"oughtness". Normative systems, in contradiction to the laws of natural
sciences, are systems of rules determining human conduct. The legal system
is only one of the many normative systems. Notwithstanding the fact
that, sociologically speaking, the legal system is interconnected with other
rule systems, legal rules can and should be differentiated from other rules
of conduct. A legal rule-necessarily a heteronomous rule-expresses the
legal consequences of a hypothetically stated fact. Only positive law is
law. The law as it is, is a -very different thing from the law as it ought
STUDIES IN

8. He chafed at the comments, both favorable and unfavorable, regarding his appointment to the Supreme Court. ". . . the immense majority of them seem to me
hopelessly devoid of personal discrimination or courage. . . . It makes one sick
when he has broken his heart in trying to make every word living and real to see a lot
of duffers, generally I think not even lawyers, talking with the sanctity of print in a
way that at once discloses to the knowing eye that literally they don't know anything
about it." Vol. I, p. io6.
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
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to be; the scientific occupation with these latter problems is not legal
science, but the science of the politics of law.
A legal rule can be conceived only in the network of a legal system.
All legal rules, whether general or individual, are based on the constitution. A legal rule must contain the link chaining it to the legal system
during the whole time of its existence. The first constitution of a state
must be regarded as a political fact. Such a political fact has to be conceived metajuridically. The law as a whole is constituted of both, general and individual legal norms. The individual rules are the concretization of general rules. While the habitual obedience to the law is necessary, while cases where the necessity of enforcement arises are relatively
rare, the enforcement, if necessary, by means of physical force, is essential
to the law.
Perhaps the most original is the third essay, in which Dr. Hexner
develops his theory that legal rules must be manifested in a human language either by the spoken or written word, or by non-linguistic signs
which easily may be transposed into sentences of a human language. The
legal rule must be formulated through the expression by a "sign-vehicle";
a legal rule is essentially an inter-subjective act, expressed in and to the
external world; an "unformulated" law is a contradiction in terms. The
Anglo-American "case-law", by the way, is not "lex non scripta" (Blackstone), but written law, and only different from code law, because it is
written in a different way (Maine).
The fifth essay discusses the doctrine of separation of powers, pointing to the double sense according to whether this phrase is meant in the
sense of a separation of agencies or in the sense of a separation of legal
jurisdictions. The author fully recognizes that there is no logical distinction between judicial and executive functions, because both are setting
individual legal rules as the concretization of general legal rules. That is
why he forcefully rejects Dr. Bodenheimer's fantastic thesis according to
which law and administration are two "rival agencies". He clearly shows
the theoretical untenability of Bodenheimer's dictum that besides law, there
is another instrument of social regulation, called administration. For all
agen6ies, however broad their jurisdiction may be, can be established only
by legal rules determining their jurisdiction. Courts, too, are acting as
instruments of the legal order. He opposes the Anglo-American legal
doctrine, which, fascinated exclusively by the courts, identifies law with
court-law.
In the last essay, Dr. Hexner discusses the problem of legal security.
While stating that legal security-implying legal certainty and legal
predictability-is an essential element of a legal system, he calls attention
to the fact that certainty can never be more than a lower or higher degree
of probability, that all human knowledge is, at the very best, a system of
approximations.
But while Dr. Hexner is in most points a follower of Kelsen, he
answers the question, whether the rules of human social conduct determined
by present despotic forms of government can be regarded as a legal system,
in the negative; in this one point he agrees with Bodenheimer, who holds
that the totalitarian states of today have no law. It is, therefore, appropriate to say a few words about this thesis of Dr. Bodenheimer. This
author makes a heavy "scientific" attack against Kelsen. And what is his
reasoning? If Kelsen were right, there is nothing we would have to defend
against the onslaught of tyrants; if Kelsen were right, the free nations of
the world would have no valid claim to regard themselves as defenders
of the law against despotism. Ergo: Kelsen is wrong. Quite apart from
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the openly purely political character of this reasoning, Bodenheimer's thesis
is full of mistakes .and misunderstandings. First, the word "despotism"
does not denote a particular form of government; if we take it in the Greek
sense of a rule for the ruler's benefit only, the totalitarian states would
decline to be called such, as Hexner recognizes. The real scientific difference is between autocracy and democracy, a difference as to the procedure of the creation of the law; a difference which has nothing to do
with the possible contents of either an autocratic or a democratic legal
order; democratic is not the opposite of totalitarian.
Totalitarian is the opposite of liberal; this difference points to the
expansion of competences by the State, regardless of the form of government. It is, therefore, clear, that an autocratic regime can be benevolent,
a democratic majority, as MV[irabeau warned, can be more tyrannical than
an absolute king. An absolute monarchy can be liberal; a democratic
legal order can be totalitarian. The Athenian democracy had strong leanings towards a totalitarian system; the 3t6qLg, the State, is the ultimate
value; the individual is wholly subject to the t6Xig; the Athenian democracy is the opposite of the democratic conception of the classical naturallaw school; nothing is more unGreek than the idea of "inherent rights"
of the individual. If Bodenheimer speaks of democracy, he speaks only of
the particular brand of liberalistic democracy. Not only does Bodenheimer's thesis lead to the consequence that a great part of the world today is
living without law, that human mankind, for nearly all the thousands of
years of human civilization, including the period of Greek democracy, has
been living without law, but it is clear that Bodenheimer's thesis is not an
objective scientific judgment, but a subjective political judgment. An
analysis of Bodenheimer's thesis shows that it is nothing but politics or
jus naturae thinking, that his assertion that totalitarian law is no law
amounts in fact only to the assertion that he does not like this type of law.
I have, of course, a right to say that I do not like atonal music, but does
this subjective dislike justify me scientifically to assert that atonal music
is no music?
Now, in agreeing in this point with Bodenheimer, it is clear that
an excellent theoretician like Hexner cannot accept Bodenheimer's reasons, although he accepts his result. He is, therefore, trying to base this
reasoning on theoretical grounds. While he says in one place that the
concept of legal rules in modern totalitarian states has to be distinguished
from "legal rules as conceived in the traditional manner"-a statement
against which -there can be no theoretical objection-he says in another
place that one must differentiate a "despotic" from a "legal" state, that
there are states today in which the social control of human conduct is not
based on law. He states that the identification of the state and the law
has been the main reason why Kelsen, one of the fighters for democratic
forms of government, has been attacked as justifying and legalizing absolutistic political doctrines. But, first one must distinguish between Kelsen's
theoretical and political writings. Not everything which Kelsen has written
is necessarily a writing on the "pure theory of law". Second, Hexner misconceives Kelsen's identification of state and law in the sense, as if there
could be only state-law. Hexner is mistaken in his statement that "each
legal system relates to the highest form of social organization called the
state" and denies, therefore, the juridical character of international law.
What Kelsen really means is to identify the law with the legal community;
if the legal community has reached a certain degree of centralization, we
call it a "state", but if it is largely decentralized, we do not call it a state;
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but it remains, nevertheless, a juridical order, e. g. the international juridical order.
What are the theoretical arguments which Hexner brings forward to
bolster his thesis that there is no law in the present totalitarian states?
I). That "it is a characteristic of the modem despotic forms of government that the individual is not dealt with as a social and political entity."
But neither was it in the Athenian democracy. 2). That in the totalitarian
states there is no general knowability of rules of conduct. But the knowability of these rules is always only a relative one. 3). That the totali-.
tarian, despotic regime tends to embrace all human activities. But this
argument is clearly theoretically untenable as the degree of expansion of
competence is merely a matter of positive law, not a problem of the essence
of law. Everything, theoretically speaking, can be made the object of
legal rules. Every state has a tendency to expand its competences. The
expansion of competences to spheres, traditionally regarded as "purely
personal", as well as the concentration of power in the hands of the
Executive, is a phenomenon clearly to be seen in our time also in the
democratic states. 4). That a state where there is only one rule, vesting
in one man the whole power over human social conduct, cannot be a legal
system, because legal rules can be conceived only as a part of a system, a
multiplicity of legal rules. But with regard to this argument, it is to be
said that this example given by Kelsen is only a constructive border-case,
nowhere realized in the totalitarian states of today, and further, that even
in such a case there is always a multiplicity 6f rules. Hexner overlooks
here what he clearly recognizes in other places, that every legal system is
constituted of general and individual legal norms.
Let us die, if necessary, for democracy; but let us not defend "scientifically" theses which are scientifically untenable. Science is theory;
its only interest is the search for truth. Science cannot deliver political
ideologies, science can justify nothing, it can only explain. For the scholar
the motto must be Spinoza's word: "non irasci, non indignari, non lugere,
sed intelligere res humanas".
Josef L. Kunz.t

CONVEYANCING IN PENNSYLVANIA (Two volumes; second edition). By
Grover Cleveland Ladner. Clark Boardman Company, Ltd., New
York, 1941. Pp. xxxiv, 495; xxviii, 496-933. Price: $15.00.
"The business of a conveyancer", said Justice Sharswood in 1868,1
"is one of great importance and responsibility. It requires an acquaintance with the general principles of the law of real property and a large
amount of practical knowledge, which can only be derived from experience." Even though title insurance companies may have largely replaced
the old time conveyancer who not only drew the papers but made the
title searches, so that, as Judge Ladner says,2 "the profession of conveyancing as once understood no longer exists", Justice Sharswood's statement is still an apt measure of what is required of the modem lawyer or
real estate broker who assists a client in the transfer of title to real estate.
"If from want of proper knowledge, from a failure to use proper means,
' Professor of Law, University of Toledo.
i. Watson v. Muirhead, 57 Pa. 16i, 167 (1868).
2. Page 534.
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or from carelessness in applying those means to the matter in hand, loss
results to his client, the fault is his and he will be responsible." 8
In this Second and Revised Edition of a work originally published
in 1912, Judge Ladner might have written with the foregoing requirements
constantly before him as his specifications. He has clearly and concisely
set forth the general principles of the Pennsylvania law of real property,
described and illustrated the means to be selected to accomplish the desired
result and, out of a long and varied experience, he brings to the reader a
large number of invaluable suggestions and aids in applying the means
to the matter in hand.
After a brief discussion of the kinds of estates in land and their respective characteristics, the acquisition of title is considered. The method of
treatment may be illustrated by the author's handling of Agreements of
Sale which, to this reviewer, seem to be the most important and difficult
of the instruments which the conveyancer is called upon to prepare. Too
often is the agreement prepared in haste from a printed form, with too
little thought to the various special contingencies which ought to be provided for and without adequate consideration of the suitability of the form
selected. For this Judge Ladner provides an antidote which is not only
effective but is so well presented as to be instantly available to the practitioner, no matter how hurried he may be.
Judge Ladner's method is to begin with an agreement of sale, printed
in full, and to follow with a detailed discussion of each separate clause of
the agreement so as to bring out its purpose and its operation in the light
of the relevant decisions. Sometimes local custom is a factor, as for example, the custom in Philadelphia to apportion taxes and water rents to
the date of settlement,4 and in each such case the reader is properly warned.
Finally, Judge Ladner devotes a section 5 to his "Suggestions in Drawing
Agreements of Sale". Here he sets forth fifteen specific suggestions in
which knowledge and experience are applied for the guidance of the reader.
For example: 6
"6. When purchasing a property occupied by a tenant, examine
the property and determine what fixtures the tenant placed in the
property and what he claims the right to remove (McKay v. Meyer
Co., 44 Pa. Super. Ct. 293-i9io). Do this especially where the prem-

ises about to be purchased is a store, for great liberality is shown the
tenant in the matter of trade fixtures (Lindsay v. Curtis, 236 Pa. 229
-1912; McClintock & Irvine Co. v. Aetna Explosives Co., 26o Pa.
191-1918)."

By similar methods of illustration, analysis, comment and suggestion,
the reader is taken step by step through the preparation, execution and
recording of the various other necessary instruments such as deeds, mortgages, assignments of mortgage, ground rents and the like. Title by
descent and by will, including the powers of administrators and executors
over real estate, are thoroughly considered. Other chapters are devoted
to examinations of title, real estate brokers, agents and salesmen, and settlements and title insurance, together with a most comprehensive collection
of modern forms of all kinds.
3. Charge of Judge Hare in Watson v. Muirhead, 57 Pa. 16I, i66 (i868), repeated
by the Superior Court in Bodine v. Wayne Title & Trust Co., 33 Pa. Super. 68, 75
(19o7).
4. Page 91.
5. Sec. 5o, page io4.

6. Page Io5.
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Judge Ladner's approach to his subject is from the practical side.
Without in any way belittling the sound scholarship which has- gone into
the preparation of this work, it may be said that the author has written
primarily for the benefit of persons who assist in actual conveyancing or
who advise clients as to their rights and liabilities in this field of the law.
In performing this task, Judge Ladner has carefully collected the acts of
assembly and the most important decisions. Where, as sometimes happens, he finds the law in a more or less confused state, he points out the
confusion and, where possible, charts a safe course for the reader. The
reviewer has read the text with critical care but has been denied the malicious pleasure of pointing out the omission of any important
act or deci7
sion which the author could reasonably be expected to cite.
Needless to say, this book fills an acute need. The first edition of
this work, like most other books on the subject, was prepared under conditions totally unlike those under which we now live. War, "prosperity",
a boom, a panic and a depression have succeeded one another. Values of
real estate went up like the sky rocket only to come down like the stick.
Great profits were followed by great losses with their accompanying train
of bankruptcies. Governmental regulation has increased. The results are
apparent in almost every volume of our Pamphlet Laws and reported
decisions of Pennsylvania courts. The field of real estate and conveyancing
reflects these events, not only in changed law but in changed policies of
large lenders on real estate security. Judge Ladner has followed all of
this closely and, where relevant, he sets it forth concisely and accurately.
However, writing primarily for the practitioner, he is concerned with the
law as it is, rather than the law as it ought to be.
Indeed, the only outstanding exception to this approach is found in
the author's discussion of the subject of the mortgagee's deficiency judgment after foreclosure." He earnestly protests against rules of law which
enable a mortgagee to foreclose the mortgage, purchase the property at
sheriff's sale for a nominal sum and later proceed against the mortgagor
for the entire debt without giving any credit for the actual value of the
mortgaged property. Under this state of the law, he argues, the mortgagee
is not only given both his penny and his cake but may even be allowed to
collect several times over for the same debt.9 It is no answer to say that
the mortgagor may protect himself by bidding at the sheriff's sale and
thereby assure himself that the sale price will approximate the real value
of the mortgaged property. Requirements such as the rule in Philadelphia
that all bidders except the mortgagee must deposit ten per cent of their
bids in cash usually prevent the mortgagor from registering an effective
7. Subsequent to the date on which Judge Ladner's book went to press, the legislature of Pennsylvania enacted several acts which affect or modify statements made in
the text. Among them, the following may be noted:
LadnerPage
Act of 1941
333
June 5, 1941 #46, giving the Municipal Court of Philadelphia exclusive jurisdiction over adoption.
174
June 18, 1941 #73, authorizing the taking of acknowledgments by
certain officers of the armed forces of the United States.
95,516
July 2, 1941 #1o4, making fiduciaries liable for commissions to a
real estate broker whose contract of sale was rescinded on receipt of
a higher offer.
i6, 52-53 July 3, 1941 #124, authorizing husband or wife to convey to husband and wife by entireties.
269-274 July 16, 1941 #151, relating to Deficiency Judgments.
164 ff.
July 24, 1941 #188, Uniform Acknowledgment Act.
8. Pages 265-275.
9. As apparently happened in Lomison v. Faust, 145 Pa. 8, 23 At. 377 (1892).
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bid. After discussing the several ill fated attempts of the legislature to
provide relief for the mortgagor, Judge Ladner concludes that the trouble
is caused by the rule, now firmly imbedded in Pennsylvania law, that the
price realized upon the foreclosure sale is ordinarily conclusive of the value
of the property, subject only to certain exceptions from which the mortgagor cannot usually derive adequate relief. Inasmuch as this rule is based
entirely upon judicial decision, Judge Ladner suggests that the Supreme
Court has the remedy in its own hands and, by overruling the decisions
upon which the present doctrine rests, could substitute the rule that the
price realized at the sale shall be merely prima facie evidence of the value
of the property. In any event, the problem appears to be difficult of solution by the legislature, under existing constitutional requirements, for Judge
Ladner, who has devoted himself to this question for many years does not
suggest a statutory solution. The legislature, however, did not despair and
by Act No. 151, approved July 16, 1941, has attempted to provide the
legislative relief for which, says Judge Ladner, there is still a strong demand. Whether, and to what extent this act meets the constitutional
objections to previous acts, is a matter which at this writing has not been
finally determined.' 0
While it is not within the province of a book on conveyancing to discuss exhaustively the rights and liabilities of mortgagor, mortgagee and
terre tenant, a modern treatise on Mortgages in Pennsylvannia is urgently
needed. If Judge Ladner could find the time to prepare such a treatise on
the present high standard, it should receive the same welcome reception
deserved by the present work.
Robert Brigham.4
(Fourth edition). By Charles C. Rohlfing,
Edward W. Carter, Bradford W. West, and John G. Hervey. The
Foundation Press, Inc., Chicago, 1941. Pp. xvi, 803. Price: $4.00.
Relations between government and business have been changing so
rapidly that the authors have found it necessary to issue four editions of
Business and Government within the past seven years. Their book is
designed as a textbook for college students intending to follow business as
a profession. As such it serves as a valuable orientation in that mystifying
wonderland of constitutions, statutes, and court decisions within which
business activities must now be carried on. Constitutional doctrines and
governmental policies are treated at length as they affect monopolies and
competitive practices, securities, public utilities, governmental proprietary
enterprises, transportation, credit, prices, housing, governmental revenues
and expenditures, agriculture, cooperatives, debtors, social security, labor,
and war. Comprehensiveness, indeed, is one of the principal virtues of
the volume.
A textbook must be judged by criteria that emphasize its value as an
aid to the educational process. Two groups of persons are qualified to
BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT

io. In Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Allen et al., C. P. #7, June Term,
1941, No. 3852 (C. P. Phila., September IS, ig4i), the court in an excellent opinion
by Flood, J., reluctantly held that the act was unconstitutional as applied to foreclosures which were completed prior to its passage. The reasoning of the opinion indicates the same result as to a mortgage executed prior to the passage of the act, even
though the foreclosure takes place subsequently. For a brief discussion of the constitutional questions involved, see Ladner, pages 269-274. For a discussion of the most
desirable course of action to follow pending a final determination of the constitutionality of the act, see FmuciARY REzvzw, August, 194i.
'IMember of the bar, Philadelphia.
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testify as to this value: students and teachers. Through the courtesy of a
colleague who has prescribed Business and Government as the textbook for
his course, I have obtained his students' over-all rating of the book and
their comments on its good and bad features. For the teacher reaction to
the book, my own remarks will have to suffice.
Of forty students participating in the rating, 5 rated the book "excellent", 18 "good", io "fair", 4 "poor", and 3 "very unsatisfactory". In
other words, slightly more than half thought the book excellent or good,
and slightly less than half thought it fair, poor, or very unsatisfactory.
The favorable comments by the students emphasize the fact that the
book is well-arranged, comprehensive, interestingly, clearly and concisely
written, and up-to-date. It adequately explains all unfamiliar legal terms,
and uses a large number of court cases. It is well constructed for text
purposes, using bold-faced paragraph headings and problem questions at
the end of each chapter. Large print eases the eyes of study-weary
students. The index, table of cases, and Constitution (printed as an
appendix) give the book added value as a reference work.
Students thinking in terms of the book's defects say that it lacks any
integrating theme or style, and worse, that each chapter seems to be merely
a spattering of details that leaves the student with a jumbled impression.
No threads run through a chapter to be neatly gathered together at its end.
The court cases are not satisfactorily handled. Those that bear on the
same issue are not sufficiently compared and distinguished. The thumbnail sketch of each court decision is too brief to give the student an adequate grasp of the decision's significance and logic. Legislation is treated
in a misleading manner. Bills introduced but not passed, and statutes
passed but declared unconstitutional are often discussed in detail and in the
present tense without sufficient note being taken of their present legal
nullity. Students also objected to the full citation of cases in the text; this
could have been better handled by footnotes.
If my judgment is correct, the teacher would make many of the'comments that students make, but would further appraise the book in this
fashion. The outstanding feature of the book is its broad scope and its
wealth of detailed information. Its greatest defect is stylistic. In some
chapters there is a curiously involved style, which possibly reflects the
author's over-exposure to the terminology of legal documents. At other
times the style appears so undisciplined as to convey the opposite meaning
from that intended, and occasionally, it is ungrammatical. Greater care
by the authors, and revision by an editor, should have eliminated the
stylistic difficulties, the errors of grammar and spelling, the inaccurate
bibliographical citations, the variable resort to footnotes, the inexact quotations, and the inconsistent use of tenses.' There must be some way, also,
to reduce.the astonishing range of style from Chapter II's grammar school
discussion of the Magna Charta 2 to Chapter VII's phrasing of the court
decision in Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission.'
There are inaccurate statements of fact. Examples from the first
fourth of the book will suffice. "The application by the Supreme Court
i. The entire chapter on pressure groups is in the past tense!

"King John signed a written document promising fairness and justice to all."
3.298
U. S.I (1936).
"The
Supreme Court held that the Commission was without
power to refuse
the registrant to withdraw his statement before itbecame effective, where there
was no possibility of any prejudice to the public or investors, and the Commission
2.

had challenged the integrity of a registration statement by inviting the registrant
to show cause why its effectiveness should not be suspended."
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of the 'Flow Theory' in the National Labor Relations cases" 4 was in
reality the application of the "direct effect" theory, and the court specifically
declined to use the flow theory. Not all "officers appointed by the President . . . must be approved by the Senate". 5 I doubt that during the
New Deal "the civil liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights seemed to
lose stature". 6 The unemployed would be delighted to discover, as the
authors have, that the right to work (as distinct from the freedom to contract, which is separately referred to) is guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 7 Justice Miller's statement that a party has not been deprived of his property without due process of law if he has had a fair trial
in a court of justice is scarcely the best quotation to prove "that the due
process clause guaranteed substantive rights as well as procedural rights"."
And most political scientists will be startled to find that the due process of
law clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have the status of a
"seldom used power of judicial veto" of arbitrary Federal and state
statutes.9 It is inaccurate to say, "The Sherman Act's prohibition of restraints of trade and price fixing have been permitted by the National
Recovery Act and the Miller-Tydings Acts [sic]." Imagine a student
puzzling over that statement on the night before an examination! Finally,
"Senator Patman" 10 is Representative Patman.
It is not my desire to do a good book an injustice. My complaint is
that the authors have devoted much time and talent to preparing a manuscript that, despite its being in a fourth edition, shows little evidence of
having been subjected to critical editorial revision. Textbook writers have
an unusually heavy responsibility to submit their books to college students
only after factual inaccuracies, grammatical errors, and stylistic eccentricities
have been carefully eliminated. They do both themselves and their students
an injustice in releasing a book before it is really ready for use with confidence. For there can be no doubt that Business and Government in a
well-edited form would be an excellent aid to the educational process.
James W. Fesler.t
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9. Page 82.
Io. Page 170.
t Associate Professor of Political Science, University of North Carolina.
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